By the mid-1930s, nearly a century of imperialist depredations and civil war had left China a fractured nation. The Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang (KMT), led by Chiang Kai-shek, held nominal control over the central government. Its principal opponent, the Communist Party of China (CPC), battered by years of civil war and encirclement campaigns, had retreated to the remote northwest after the Long March.
Meanwhile, Japan intensified its imperial ambitions. Tokyo signalled its intention to dominate China by invading Manchuria in 1931 and establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo. Unfortunately, Chiang remained focused on internal consolidation, prioritising “internal pacification before external resistance.”
This policy of targeting Communists while avoiding confrontation with Japan became increasingly unpopular. Intellectuals and students began calling for a united front against Japanese aggression. The CPC, recognising both the moral imperative and strategic opportunity, began advocating for a national coalition to resist Japan.
The CPC’s transformation from a beleaguered revolutionary force to a central player in national resistance was neither accidental nor purely ideological. It was a calculated shift rooted in survival and long-term vision.
The CPC recognised Japanese imperialism as a colonial threat to all Chinese people, not just Communists. Moscow, through the Communist International, urged the CPC to prioritise anti-fascist unity. This external influence reinforced the CPC’s domestic pivot toward coalition-building. As early as 1935, the CPC began calling for a “national united front” against Japan. This was not merely a slogan – it was a strategic reorientation that sought alliances with intellectuals, factions within the KMT, and even warlords. This broadened their appeal beyond class struggle to national salvation.
By 1936, the CPC had established a base in Yan’an and began direct negotiations with regional military leaders like commander of the Northeastern Army Zhang Xueliang, nicknamed “the Young Marshal”. These talks laid the groundwork for what would become the Second United Front.
Xi’an Incident
The turning point came in December 1936, in what is now known as the Xi’an Incident, a political earthquake that forced Chiang Kai-shek to reconsider his priorities. Chiang travelled to Xi’an to inspect troops and pressure Zhang Xueliang to resume attacks on the Communists. According to Australian journalist William Henry Donald, his close friend Zhang told him that Chiang had ordered the police to use machine guns against a student parade, which prompted Zhang to act. Donald reported:
“The Young Marshall and his troops, plus the force of General Yang [Hucheng], Governor of Shensi [Shaanxi], got tired of chasing the [so-called] Red bandits, tried to impress upon the Generalissimo the necessity for a change of policy embracing resistance to Japan, and cessation of anti-red campaigns. Failing to get a hearing they decided to hold the Generalissimo till he did listen to them, and in flares of temper on both sides, a situation developed that seemed to be desperate but which in reality was not dangerous from the Sian point of view but which was filled with menace from the Nanking end. The Young Marshall merely wanted a change of policy. He did not, as alleged, want money, or deposition of the Generalissimo, or injury of him.”
On the morning of 12 December 1936, Zhang and Yang Hucheng detained Chiang at Huaqing Hot Springs, where he was staying. They took Chiang to a residence in Lintong District, about 20 kilometres east of Xi’an City centre and held him captive there.
The CPC, while having been in secret talks with Zhang and other regional commanders, had no direct involvement in the detention. Zhou Enlai, representing the CPC, flew by military plane from Nanjing to Xi’an to negotiate Chiang’s release and secure a formal agreement for cooperation. He managed to prevent the execution of his former colleague Chiang. He sat down with Chiang, other KMT officials and Red Army senior cadres and talked through several days and nights.
On behalf of the nascent Chinese nation, Zhou dedicated his formidable diplomatic skill and persuasiveness to unifying anti-Japanese forces. He chose to make peace and find common ground with his enemies, rejecting a path of vengeance. Zhang released Chiang on 25 December 1936, after the latter had given verbal assurances. The Xi’an Incident, with its dramatic detention of Chiang Kai-shek, was not merely a political crisis, but a crucible in which the CPC’s vision for national resistance was vindicated.
However, after the Xi’an Incident, Chiang imprisoned Yang Hucheng for 13 years, ordering him and his family executed before retreating to Taiwan in 1949. He kept Zhang Xueliang under house arrest for over 50 years in mainland China and Taiwan. After his release, Zhang emigrated to Hawaii to be with his family in 1993. Both Yang and Zhang are considered national heroes.
Second United Front
Chiang renounced publicly the terms agreed to during captivity, but continued negotiations privately. The result was the formation of the Second United Front in 1937: a formal alliance between the CPC and KMT. Under the terms of the alliance, both parties committed to resisting Japanese aggression, though coordination remained limited and fraught with mistrust. The CPC agreed to accept Chiang’s leadership of the coalition. In return the KMT-run government agreed to halt military operations against the CPC and to fund the Red Army’s operations to a certain extent. The CPC gained legitimacy through being allowed to operate openly under the banner of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army.
The Second United Front was a paradox: a coalition born of coercion and necessity, yet one that fundamentally altered the balance of power in China. The wartime coalition was short-lived in spirit but long-lasting in consequence. Left wing sections of the KMT, which later coalesced as the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang (RCCK) continued to cooperate with the CPC after Chiang broke up the Second United Front. Today, the RCCK is a junior partner in the CPC-led governmental coalition.
While the KMT technically bore the brunt of conventional warfare, many allied sources confirmed that Chiang preferred to conserve his forces for a reckoning with the CPC after the war. They reported that the KMT forces suffered from high desertion rates, as well as malnutrition and ill-health among other ranks, caused by corruption in the high command.
Meanwhile, the CPC focused on asymmetric tactics. The Eighth Route Army grew rapidly, becoming a formidable force in guerrilla warfare against Japanese troops. The commander of American forces in the theatre, General Joseph Stillwell expressed his admiration for the Red Army and for its commander Zhu De who, in contrast to Chiang, engaged the enemy with zeal.
The CPC avoided annihilation and expanded its base. Participation in the anti-Japanese war gave the CPC patriotic credibility. The war effort allowed the CPC to consolidate its political position and build grassroots support through land reform, education, and anti-Japanese propaganda, expanding its influence in rural areas, especially in North China.
Showdown
The CPC used the war years to prepare for the inevitable showdown with the KMT. By 1945, the CPC revolution had transformed from an insurgency on the margins of China into a nationwide movement with deep popular support.
The CPC’s policy in this regard remained consistent with the principles of Marxism. To Lenin, the interests of the world proletariat dictated the duty of aiding oppressed peoples in their national and patriotic struggle against imperialism. In participating in the military struggle under the orders of Chiang, since unfortunately he had command in the war for independence, the CPC managed to prepare politically for the overthrow of Chiang.
Chiang’s detention in Xi’an inadvertently catalysed the very coalition he had resisted. The CPC’s deft navigation of ideology, diplomacy, and military strategy during this period laid the foundation for its eventual victory in 1949.
Though the Second United Front was fragile and riddled with contradictions, it gave the CPC the breathing room and legitimacy it needed to survive, grow, and ultimately triumph. In the annals of revolutionary strategy, few episodes demonstrate the power of coalition-building under duress as vividly as China’s wartime pivot in 1937. The CPC’s ability to turn adversity into opportunity remains a defining chapter in the story of modern China.
( Vinod Moonesinghe read mechanical engineering at the University of Westminster and worked in Sri Lanka’s tea machinery, motor spares, and railway industries. He later turned to journalism and history. He served as chair of the Board of Governors of the Ceylon German Technical Training Institute and of the Board of Management of the National Institute of Language Education and Training. He is a co-convenor of the Asia Progress Forum.)
by Vinod Moonesinghe
asiaprogressforum@gmail.com
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