by Tissa Jayatilaka
(This article is based on a talk given to the members of the Sri Lanka Foreign Service Association on the 10th of December, 2024. First part of it appeared in The Island of 01 Jan. 2025).
Meantime Trump on Monday, 2 December, 2024, in a post on ‘Truth Social’ indicated that he seeks an Israel-Hamas ceasefire before he takes office in January. He has promised that ‘there will be hell to pay’ if captives held in Gaza during Israel’s ongoing war are not released when he becomes President on 20 January, 2025. Whether this is all too familiar Trump bluster or if he is serious in his intent is not yet clear. It also seems contradictory to his ‘America First’ policy.
What of Trump’s likely China policy? Rick Waters, a former State Department specialist on China, who worked for the first Trump term, in a recent ‘China Power Podcast’ with Bonn Lynn, the Director of the ‘China Power Project’ and Senior Advisor at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) in Washington D.C, is of the view that there is likely to be ‘significant volatility’ in the US-China relationship. Biden, Waters observes, did not re-set the China Policy of Trump when he took over the Presidency in 2020. Waters is of the view that a ‘leader level channel’ between the US and China is crucial when Trump begins his second term. He foresees the establishment of ‘Asian NATO’ in the Indo-Pacific to counter China whereby the QUAD and AUKUS will be strengthened, and Washington- Tokyo-Manila and Washington-Tokyo- Seoul trilateral alliances formed.
The entrenched view held in Washington, according to Brian Wong of The Diplomat in his insightful piece titled How will China react to Donald Trump’s Second Term (13 November, 2024) is that the United States is uniquely confronted by a systemic rival in China, and that swift and assertive responses are needed to prevent the displacement of US hegemony by a state beholden to neither the values nor interests of Washington.
Wong’s view is that Trump’s likely approach to China is best likened to “Russian roulette” given Trump’s penchant for risky gambits and transactional diplomacy. Some commentators feel that Trump, as he did in his first term, will broker “deals” in order to steer the East Asian region away from a hot war – – though through what means and with what effects he will do so are not as clear. Trump’s China advisory and foreign policy team seems set to feature a combination of individuals harbouring deeply ideological grievances towards China (Marco Rubio, Tom Cotton, and Robert O’Brien); or a tendency to view China through the lens of a great power competition that the United States must win (Ric Grennell, Elbridge Colby, and Bill Hagerty); or the belief that trade globalisation has been anathema to the U.S. interests of the U.S working class and domestic interests in general (Robert Lighthizer, Peter Navarro).
Few amongst these are interested in “cooperating” with China- – which they construe to be an existential risk to the United States, economically, militarily, and geo-strategically. US engagement with China, they would declare unequivocally, has failed.
Trump will have to moderate some of his extreme and self-undermining protectionist measures so as to deliver for the MAGA crowd that voted him into office- -if he is even remotely committed to bringing down prices, the Achilles’ heel of the Biden administration.
Today’s international, political, and geopolitical scene is dominated primarily by the different worldviews of the United States and China. According to Stephen Roach- -the author of ‘Unbalanced: The Co-dependency of America and China’ (2014) and ‘Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives’ (2022)- – ‘Sinophobia’, which began in the United States at the beginning of the 21st century, is in full swing today based mostly on their competition in the fields of technology and trade. China has responded with ‘Ameriphobia’ demonising the United States for its accusations of Chinese economic espionage, unfair trading practices, and human rights violations.
The U.S has long been intolerant of competing ideologies and alternative systems of government. The claim of ‘American exceptionalism’ seemingly compels the United States to impose American views and values on others. That was true during the Cold War, and it is true again today.
The western bias over ‘losing China’ after the 1949 Revolution warned us of a “Red Peril”. Today we are being warned of a ‘Rising China’, modernising its nuclear and defence programmes. This ‘China bogey’, as the late Jayantha Dhanapala, the former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs and foremost Sri Lankan diplomat noted a few years ago, will continue to be peddled as part of a larger conspiracy to create a new a Cold War in Asia between a ‘democratic’ India and an ‘autocratic’ China.
To put it briefly, if the prevailing Sinophobic tension in the United States-China relations deteriorates further, it will not do any of us any good. The leaders of the U.S “need to avoid the low road and think more in terms of being the adult in the room.” (Roach:2024). Roach quotes Franklin Roosevelt’s memorable line from his inaugural address in 1933, “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself,” and notes that amidst Sinophobic frenzy, that message is well worth remembering. Amen, I say.
The geopolitical rivalry emanating from the fraught U.S.- China power competition is complicated further, by what appears to be, India’s ambiguous role. True, India is a part of the QUAD and I2U2 (a security partnership among India, Israel, United Arab Republic and the United States), but India also has close relations with Russia and Iran. The recent border agreement between India and China is viewed as a diplomatic breakthrough, given the heightened tensions between the two sides after the Galwan Valley clash in 2020. Some observers suggest that the current breakthrough signals a significant change in India’s threat perceptions of China, with some India- China watchers interpreting it as a desire on India’s part to operate independently of its relationship with the United States. It may also be indicative of India’s interest to bolster its economy while continuing to flaunt, what India refers to as, its multialigned foreign policy.
In the emerging scenario in which complex geopolitical developments are at play in Asia and the Indian Ocean Region, Sri Lanka would do well to steer clear of them and adopt what I would term the ‘Penelope strategy’ that we encounter in Homer’s epic poem ‘Odyssey’. This is the non-committal path, that Sri Lanka, given its unalterable geographic location, needs to take if it wishes to avoid harm arising from ‘big’ power conflict in our region.
In 2002, during a Fulbright Visiting Scholar Enrichment Conference held in Washington D.C, Prof. Benjamin Barber of the University of Maryland gave a memorable keynote speech titled Democracy vs. Jihad vs. McWorld. In this speech he urged the United States, which has lived for almost 226 years with the ‘Declaration of Independence’, to now issue a ‘Declaration of Interdependence’. Given, especially the non-traditional security threats all of us face today, such as, resource scarcity, climate change which can lead to environmental degradation, natural disasters, poverty, infectious diseases, drug trafficking and terrorism that affect all of humanity, Prof. Barber’s call is even more urgent today than when he first articulated it. In the 21st century that we live in, ‘smart weapons’ are much less important than ‘smart ideas’.
The reality of the world of today is interdependence, as Prof. Barber pointed out almost 25 years ago. I would add one other ingredient and say that today we need both interdependence and multilateralism (however anathematic that may be to Mr. Trump and his colleagues-to-be). As the former Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one of Sri Lanka’s outstanding diplomats (now retired) said a few months ago when he delivered the inaugural Jayantha Dhanapala Memorial Oration, given that all threats or concerns humanity faces ‘are borderless in form and content, negotiating solutions and mitigating measures must, of necessity, be multilateral’. In a multipolar world, and in an order that is in flux we need more multilateralism than ever before, opined Palihakkara.
As a lead-up to this conclusion of his, Palihakkara told us the following:
As one of my dialogue partners from across Palk Straits commented in a lighter vein, the multilateral system needs to respond quicker before the AI-equipped cheap drones can become the poor man’s weapon of mass destruction.
Although stated in a lighter vein, one notes a serious underlying point in the above quote which underscores the direction in which we should head if we are to live in a peaceful world. (Concluded)
from The Island https://ift.tt/kOtjVWw
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